Section 1. Introduction.
The stock-price reaction to new security issues by American firms has been examined extensively. The existing literature shows convincingly that the announcement of new public domestic (as opposed to offshore) security issues by U.S. firms is associated with a decrease in the firms' stock price that increases with the risk of the security issued: there is no significant effect For AAA debt, a significant drop for convertible debt, and a larger drop for equity issues.'
The most widely accepted interpretation For these results is that new issues convey information about the value of the issuing firms equity. If managers maximize the wealth of existing shareholders, they avoid issuing securities at prices such that the buyers of new securities would benefit at the expense of the existing shareholders. Therefore, an issue of a risky security is evidence that managers believe that the firm is not undervalued too much by the market.
It is widely argued that managers in Japan pursue different objectives than managers in the U.S.7 Some view this difference in a favorable light, arguing that Japanese managers do not have to focus on short-term results and can take a long view which allows them to produce more wealth for shareholders. Others view this difference as evidence that Japanese managers are more interested in pursuing objectives such as the maximization of market share than in maximizing shareholder wealth. The purported difference in the objectives of managers between Japan and the U.S. makes Japan a good testing ground for corporate finance theories developed in the U.S. In particular, similar stock-price reactions to new security issues in the two countries would make it harder to believe that there are significant differences in managerial incentives between the two countries.
a fixed fraction of all its payouts. This is because (1) these investors want to keep their stake in the firm constant, so that they participate in new issues, (2) some of them hold debt as well as equity! and (3) these investors have business relationships with the firms in which they invest, so that they gain when these firms invest even if their shares do not increase in value. If it is correct to view Japanese long-term investors as fixed-fraction investors and if managers maximize the wealth of these investors, the existing theoretical literature suggests that security issues should not be informative about the mispricing of existing securities.5
In this paper, we investigate further the stock-price reaction to new issues in Japan by using a large database of new issues for which we have announcement dates from the morning edition of the Nihon Kelial Shlnbun, which is the equivalent of the Wall Street Joumal for Japan.
This sample covers the period from January 1, 1985 , to May 31, 1991 . Hence, the sample allows us to investigate whether the abnormal returns to new issue announcements are related to the bull market. With this database, our announcement dates and sample selection procedures are equivalent to what researchers have used for U.S. domestic issues. Our sample includes public equity, private equity, rights offerings, straight debt, warrant debt, and convertible debt issues. The number of straight debt and warrant debt issues is too small to permit a detailed analysis, however. We first use our sample to establish that stock-price reactions to new issues are indeed different for Japanese firms. In particular, we find positive announcement returns for both equity issues and convertible issues.
We then explore four possible interpretations for the difference in results:
1. Institutional differences and/or market Inefficiencies. The institutional setting for 'See Gerlach (1992) , Gilson and Roe (1993) and Kester (1991) for analyses which stress the complex relationships between long-term investors in Japan and the firms they invest in.
See Dybvig and Zender (1991) , Persons (1994) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) . security issues in Japan is strongly different from the one in the U.S. It could therefore be that the Japanese institutional setting allows firms to manipulate security prices around security offerings. Alternatively, the disclosure process could be such that issues are not a surprise when announced. Our evidence is inconsistent with the view that the announcement is fully anticipated since we find significant positive abnormal returns on the announcement date. We find a significant negative abnormal return at the offering date of equity issues which is much larger in absolute value than the abnormal return observed in the U.S. and which is larger than the announcement abnormal return. We do not find this pattern with convertible bond issues: for convertible bond issues there is a positive announcement effect and a positive issue date return.
2. Deregulation effects. The Eighties are an abnormal period in Japan because of deregulation. We find the stock-price reaction for convertible debt issue announcements of firms which have no convertible debt on their balance sheet is significantly higher than the stock-price reaction for issues by other firms. A plausible interpretation of this result is that, because or the relaxation of eligibility criteria for the issuance of convertible debt issues, a firm's first convertible debt issue provides information to the markets that the firm is becoming more independent frorn banks.6 3. "Bubble economy" effects. The Japanese stock market experienced very large positive returns during the second half of the 1980s followed by a spectacular crash at the beginning of the 1990s, so that the Nikkei 225 index tripled from 1985 to 1989 and then lost the gains it had made. Some observers believe that the increase in the Japanese stock market corresponds to a "bubble" that cannot be explained by changes in fundamentals.' These observers might argue that poitive abnormal returns to risky security issues is just another • See Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) .
See French and Poterba (1991) for a discussion of this period.
example of irrationality associated with the "bubble" economy and point to the fact that Kato and Schalheim (1992) find negative abnormal returns for equity issues in the first half of the 1970s.
Though the positive stock-price reactions associated with equity issue announcements are highest in 1965 and 1987 in our sample, our evidence does not indicate that abnormal returns in 1990
and 1991 are similar to those observed in the U.S. and, consequently, the differences in abnormal returns between the two countries persist after the end of the bull market in Japan.
4. Differences in corporate control mechanisms. If differences in control methanisms explain pail or all of our results, one would expect that the Japanese firms which are most similar to U.S. firms should have stock-price reactions similar to US. firms. We first explore whether nonKeiretsu firms have stock-price reactions similar to those of U.S.. firms and find that in our sample the distinction between Keiretsu and non-Keiretsu firms is largelyuninformative. We then explore whether large Japanese firms, where management is presumably less constrained by the web of relationships in which Japanese firms operate, have different stock-price reactions. There we find strong differences. In fact, large Japanese corporations have stock-price reactions closer to those of American corporations for equity issues. However, large Japanese corporations still have positive stock-price reactions to convertible issues, albeit significantly smaller than for small corporations. Finally, we explore the relation between abnormal returns and the extent to which a firm is financed by bank loans. For equity issues, firms with more bank loans have more positive abnormal returns. Firms with no reported bank loans have an average abnormal return of -0.92% on announcement of an equity issue in contrast to a matched sample of firms of similar sue issuing equity in the same year which has an average abnormal return of 1.60W However, bank loans are not helpful in understanding the cross-sectional variation in the abnormal returns for convertible bond issue announcements.
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe our sample in section 2. In section 3, we provide abnormal returns (or various subperiods of interest. In section 4, we explore possible explanations for the stock-price reactions we observe. We conclude in section 5.
Section 2. The sample of issues and firm characteristics.
To obtain our sample, we proceed as follows. We start from the list of new issues from the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) Annual Securities Statistics for the period from January 1, 1985, to May 31, 1991.8 We then exclude all new issues which do not satisfy the following criteria:
1) The issuing firm is listed on the TSE and stock price data are available on the daily returns files from the Pacific-Basin Capital Market (PACAP) Research Center. The daily returns files includes returns for all First and Second Section stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. We exclude utilities and financial companies (the required data for financial companies are not available on the PACAP files which are used in this study).
2) The date of the initial public announcement is available from the morning edition of the Nihon Keizai Shinbun.
3) The issue involves a single type of security, is not accompanied by a stock dividend, and the firm does not release important information, such as earnings, with the announcement of the issue. (Firms which simultaneously issue the same type of security on the domestic market and offshore are excluded.) Schallheim (1992, 1993) use the Commercial Law Review to construct samples of private and public equity issues. Their study has only three full years which overlap with our sample, namely 1985, 1986 and 1987 . For these years, they have 19 private placements and 76 public equity issues in contrast to our 31 private placements and 37 public issues which are not rights offerings. The samples differ because (1) we require an announcement in the Nihon Keizai Shinbun, (2) they consider only firms listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, (3) we exclude firms which simultaneously announce a stock dividend and (4) we exclude issues by utilities and financial companies. The second difference may explain their smaller number of private issues, whereas the exclusion of firms with simultaneous stock dividends and of financial companies may help explain why we have fewer public equity issues S These sample selection criteria produce a sample of 875 issues described in table 1 Our sample contains mostly convertible debt issues and public equity issues. The predominance of convertible debt issues is not surprising given the aggregate statistics on security offerings published by NUmi (1992a) . Niimi (1992a) shows thai convertible debt is the principal source of public funds for Japanese companies throughout the Eighties. Our sample understates the importance of equity-linked debt for Japanese firms since it includes only domestic issues. As discussed in Kang et al. (1994) , dollar-denominated warrant bond issues were a major source of funds for Japanese companies during the 1980s. We found few strai9hl debt issues. In addition,
we found almost no warrant bonds. Again, this is not particularly surprising in light of Ihe statistics in Niimi (1992a) . There is some clustering of the issues during the height of the bubble economy period. More than 40% of the equity issues and about 25% of the convertible issues are in 1989.
Ranaeda (1993) shows that finns issued only rights offerings in the 1950s, but that over time the proportion of underwritten equity offerings among equity issues increased to reach the point where most equity issues are underwritten offerings. This shift towards underwritten offenngs has made Japanese firms more similar to American firms in their issuing practices. It is interesting that more than half of the rights offerings in our sample take place after the spectacular growth in the Nikkei 225 index has stopped. Based on our sample, we cannot tell whether this corresponds to a resurgence of rights offerings or to the unique circumstances associated with the end of the "bubble economy°.9 Table 2 shows the characteristics of firms issuing the various types of securities. These financial data are obtained from the PACAP Research Center database and from the Analyst's l-fanaeda (1993) provides evidence on the total number of each type of equity issue for each year from 1970 to 1990. He finds that the proportion of rights offerings as a fraction of the total number of issues is larger in 1990 than in any year during the 1980s, but he does not note this fact in his analysis. Table 2 Cflaracteristics of the Issuing firms The announcements are by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which an event date could be obtained from the Niflon Keizal Shinbun during the period from January 1, 1985 to May 31, 1991 and for which information is available from the PACAP files. The Yen amounts are in billion Yen. Beta is estimated from -220 to -20, where date 0 is the announcement date of the issue. The 0 proxy is (total liabilities + market value of equity)/(total liabilities + book value of equity). Leverage is measured as (total liabilities)/(total liabilities + market value of equity). The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the median. Section 3. The stock-price reaction to security offerings.
In table 3, we provide estimates of excess retums over various subperiods. The excess returns are computed in the following way. We group the TSE securities into ten equal size control portfolios ranked according to their Scholes and Williams (1977) beta estimates computed with respect to the PACAP equally-weighted portfolio for Japan. Then, we assign the stock of 'ung firm to one ni these portfolios. We compute the abnormal return on a particular day by tkr.. be difference between the return on the issuing flmts stock and an equally-weighted ctntrca r.nrifolio Though the event period comprising the day of the announcement and the day befcre S the one researchers typically focus on for U.S. studies, we pay rnore attention to the nd::! .-.h.ch inckjdes the day after the announcement. Including this additional day eliminates 5or'e of the microstructure effects which could arise because of order flow imbalances on the day of the announcement and because of the existence of price limits.
We discuss the abnormal retum estimates for each type of issue in turn:
I. Public equity offerings. The announcement return, defined as the cumulative return for the three-day window surrounding the publication of the announcement, is significantly positive (-9.76)" (-3.27) 0.06 (-1.07) (0.09) but small. 0.45% with a t-statistic of 1.73. The median is 0.34%, and the sign-rank test statistic is not significant. The results are slightly stronger for the two-day window which includes the announcement day and the day before. During the 19 days preceding the announcement, there are nine negative abnormal returns and 10 positive abnormal returns. Only one of these abnormal returns is significantly different from zero, namely day -19, which is -0.22% with a t-statistic of -1.74. This evidence indicates that our announcement date is meaningful. Day -1 with an abnormal return of 0.41%, has the highest abnormal return in absolute value for days -20 to 0 and the highest t-statistic. None of the 10 days following the announcement have a significant abnormal return. On the issuance day, the abnormal retum is negative. Its mean, median and t-statistic are all greater in absolute value than the announcement day abnormal return. For the 10 days preceding the issue day, one abnormal return is significantly positive and twO are significantly negative. The day after the issue is significantly negative, but none of the next nine days are significantly different from zero. Seven of these next nine days have a positive abnormal return though. Table 3 shows that the cumulative abnormal returns from the day before the announcement to the day after the issue are insignificant. Further, after the issue, the cumulative returns for the next 20 days are negative, but the mean is insignificant. Finally returns from day -60 before the announcement to day +20 after the issue are insignificantly negative. Since the issue day abnormal return is signilicant, we provide a measure of the total abnormal return associated with the announcement and issue dates. To gel this measure, we add up the abnormal return for the three days surrounding the announcement date and the three days surrounding the issue date. For equity issues, the mean of this total effect measure is insignificantly negative; the median is also negative and the sign-rank test is significant at the 0.05 level.
Private equity issues. Here, the effect is largely similar to what is found in the U.S.1°T
here is a large significant effect for the three days surrounding the announcement day. The stock-price reaction is 3.13% with a t-statistic of 2.39. There is no additional effect on issuance day. Private equity tinancings are shown here for the sake of completeness. They have been analyzed extensively by Kato and Schallheim (1993) over the period 1974 to 1988. They report an abnormal return of 4.98% on the board date and the day following the board date for their sample. 3. Rights offerings. The stock-price reaction to rights offerings is strongly positive on the announcement day. There is no further effect on issuance day. In contrast, the announcement day effect in the U.S. is close to zero)' 4. StraIght bond Issuei. Neither the announcement nor the issue date abnormal returns° See Wruck (1989) .
See Eckbo and Masulis (1992) .
are statistically significant. Since there are so few issues, however, the average abnormal returns are not estimated precisely. It is interesting to note that the economic significance of the total abnormal returns for straight bond issues is similar to the economic significance of the total abnormal returns for the warrant bond issues and the convertible bond issues discussed next.
The total average abnormal return is 1.53% with a t-statistic of 1.45.
5. Warrant bond Issues. We have 19 offerings, in contrast to the 368 offshore offerings in Kang et at. (1994) . There is no significant stock-price reaction to the issue announcement, but a positive stock-price reaction to the issuance is found when the three days surrounding the issuance are considered. The total average abnormal return is 1.34% with a t-statistic of 1.45.
6. ConvertIble bond Issues. The stock-price reaction to convertible bond issues is surprisingly similar to the reaction documented in Kang et al. (1994) for offshore warrant bonds.
We find a significant positive reaction to the announcement of 1.05% for the three days surrounding the announcement. For the 19 days before the day preceding the announcement, there is one significant abnormal return on day -9. On that day, there is an increase of 0.15% with a t-statistic of 1.70. The day -9 abnormal return is the largest for these 19 days. It is much smaller than the day 0 announcement return of 0.77% which has a t-statistic of 7.20. Following the announcement, all abnormal returns from day +1 to day +10 are positive except for day +2.
In addition, three of these abnormal returns are significantly positive. This positive drift is clear from the table, which shows that from day +1 after the announcement date to day-i before the issuance dale, the cumulative abnormal return is 2.79% with a t-statistic of 6.67. Kang et al. (1994) also find a positive drift after the announcement of offshore warrant bond issues. Over the three days surrounding issuance, the abnormal return is significantly positive. There is some negative dnft from days +1 after the issue to day +20. Over these days, the cumulative abnormal return is -1.21% with a t-statistic of -3.66. The total effect measure is positive and significant.
In this section, we focus on public equity and convertible debt issues. his dear from the evidence in section 3 that the average total effect of the announcements associated with public equity issues is not significantly different from zero and that the average total effect of the announcements associated with public convertible debt issues is significantly positive. In studies of Japanese corporate finance, it is tempting to focus first and foremost on differences in the organization of firms with respect to the U.S. However, there are also differences in how markets are organized and these differences may be important for our sample. Before focusing on the implications of the organization of firms for our results, we address first potential explanations for our results which have to do with the organization of markets, the regulation of corporate finance in Japan and the "bubble economy."
Market organization effects.
Our results have several puzzling aspects which appear inconsistent with the hypothesis that markets are working without impediments. We consider in turn the puzzles concerning equity issues and convertible debt issues. a) Equity issues. For equity issues, there is a significant positive abnormal return for the three days surrounding the announcement. This suggests that the market views an equity issue as a positive event. Since the issuance itself confirms that a positive event is taking place for sure, one would expect a slight positive return. Instead, we observe a significant negative return of -1.01% on the three days surrounding the issue with a t-statistic of -3.82. Lease, Masulis and Page (1991) propose an explanation for the fall of 0.3% on the day of the issue for industrial firms in the U.S.. They argue that there is an order-flow imbalance on that day because individuals who want to buy the stock use the secondary issue to do so, so that on the primary market there are more sell orders than buy orders and the recorded prices are more likely to be bid prices than ask prices. Since trading costs are substantially higher in Tokyo than in the U.S., the same explanation could be at work here.12 If this explanation is correct, one would expect prices to bounce back after the issue day. There is no evidence of prices rebounding. The median abnormal return is never positive For the 10 days following the issue day.
Although only three or the mean abnormal returns are negative in these 10 days. the highest Istatistic is 1.06 and the highest mean abnormal return, 0.205%, on day +5 is lower in absolute value than the lowest mean abnormal return, -0.226%, on day +9. Finally, for the 20 days following the issue announcement, both the average abnormal return and the median are negative. Though the t-statistic is insignificant, the sign-rank test, statistic is significant at the 0.01 level, Of course, it could be the case that there is a negative drift after the offering that is partially offset by reversal& In regressions not reported here, we regressed the three-day issue abnormal return on the log of the market value of equity and the log of share price. Neither variable has a significant coefficient.
An alternative explanation could be that, rather than the price at the end of the issue day being abnormally low, the price the day before is abnormally high because of price support. In Japan. the offering day is the day when those who subscribed pay for the shares they bought.
Hence, there is no reason to support the share price after the offering day. Underwriters are allowed to support the stock price between the day when the offering is priced and the offering 12 See Hamao and Hasbrouèk (1992) For a description of the Tokyo market and estirnates of the spread For the limit-order book. They investigate three stocks, all of which have a substantially higher capitalization than the average stock of a firm issuing equity in our sample. Their highest average spread is 1%, It could be that the spread for the stocks in our sample exceeds 1%, so that the negative abnormal return on issue day would be comparable in its relation to the spread with the negative abnormal return on issue day in the U.S.
day. This period normally corresponds to the ten days before the offering day.'3 Although! price support or ramping seems to be a plausible explanation for the pattern of stock returns we observe, we had no success in finding (races of price support in the data. In our investigation, we focused on two samples of raw returns. The first sample (pre-sarnple) includes the raw returns for the ten days before the issue for each firm. The second sample (post-sample) includes the raw returns for the ten days starting thirty days after equity issues take place for each firm. The pre-sample has 1766 returns and the post sample 1827. The pre-sample has a mean return of 0.068% in contrast to 0.147% for the post-sample; the variance of the returns in the pre-sample is slightly lower than in the post-sample (4.76% versus 5.55%) and the skewness is slightly higher (0.92 versus 0.80). At best, the variance and skewness results indicate faint evidence of price support. However, this evidence becomes even weaker when one looks at the proportion of negative returns. In the pre-sample, 33.24% of the returns are below -0.6% compared to 36.45% in the post-sample. If we focus on returns lower than -3%, we find that 5.78% of the beforesample are below -3% in comparison with 6.13% of the returns in the post sarnple. We tried to relate the offering day abnormal return to the number of days in the previous ten days the firm experienced a negative stock return in excess of one standard deviation of the firms return. If a firm's stock price benefits from price support, one would see few such large negative returns but one would expect a sharp drop on the offering day. Therefore, it is likely that there is a positive relation between the nurnber of large negative returns and the offering day abngrnial returns.
Instead, we found a negative insignificant relation. b) Convertible debt issues. The announcement effect for convertible debt is positive and significant. The issue day announcement effect is also positive and significant, but much smaller. This is consistent with markel efficiency if there is some probability that the issue will not take 13 See Hanaeda (1993). place and the stock market reacts negatively to the news that the issue will not take place. What seems harder to explain is the existence of positive abnormal returns from the time of the issue announcement to the day before the issue. We find a cumulative abnormal return of 2.79% with a t-statistic of 6.67. This result suggests that a trading strategy of investing in the stock when the firm announces a convertible issue and selling the stock immediately before the issue date has a positive abnormal return which exceeds potential transactions costs. One concern is that these trading profits could reflect the use of an inappropriate benchmark for returns computed over long periods of time. However, although we do not report the results in a table, we investigated whether these cumulative abnormal returns depend on firm size by splitting our sample of firms into large and small firms. We found that the cumulative abnormal return from the day after the announcement to the day before the issue is 2.67% for the large firms with a median of 1.29% and is 2.90% br the small firms with a median of 1.05%. Neither the mean nor the median difference is significant. It therefore seems unlikely that these cumulative abnormal returns are due to a misspecified benchmark.
The evidence sug9ests that the positive abnormal returns for convertible bond issues are more convincing than for equity issues. In either case, though, there is no evidence of a price drop of the magnitude observed for U.S. firms.
Deregulation effects.
In the 1980s, there was considerable deregulation in Japan. Before the 1980s, financing through domestic bond issues was extremely difficult for Japanese companies.' First, unsecured issues were not allowed. Second, firms wishing to issue secured bonds could only do so if they " See Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) and Niimi (1992a.b) lot discussions of the evolution of the Japanese bond market and of the evolulion of the eligibility criteria for bond issuance. satisfied restrictive balance sheet conditions. Qualifying firms could issue only at specified times determined both by a queuing system and the practice of only issuing bonds at the end of the month. The thoice of maturity for bonds was restricted. Lead managers were assigned to firTns on a rotating basis to insure a balance of underwriting income among the Oig Four securities firms. Finally, interest rates on public bonds were regulated.
In 1979, Sears Roebuck made the first unsecured foreign bond issue on the Japanese market. Immediately following that issue, a regulatory standard for issuing unsecured bonds was adopted. It was so stringent that, until January 1983, only Toyota Motors and Matsushita Electric were allowed to issue domestic unsecured bonds. In January 1983, nine additional firms were allowed to issue unsecured straight debt and 23 more firms were allowed to issue unsecured convertible debt. The standards were progressively relaxed, so that by 1987, 180 firms were allowed to issue unsecured straight debt and 330 firms were allowed to issue unsecured convertible debt. A revision to the Commercial Code in April 1991 made the issuing standards less of an obstacle for most firms.
Changes in eligibility requirements to issue debt and equity-linked debt could explain positive abnormal returns. To see this, suppose that long-term shareholders allow firms to access capital markets, after they become eligible, only if their prospects are good enough that close monitoring of their actions through banks is no longer necessary.'5 In this case, the first issue after a firm becomes eligible would convey information to the markets that a firm has good prospects. Hence, a first issue could reveal different information for Japanese firms during this sample period than for American firms because Japanese firms were allowed, for the first time, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) provide a model where the best firms raise funds on public markets because they do not benefit from dose monitoring as much as other firms. They provide some empirical support of their model by investigating how reliance on bank loans changed across firms during the 1980s in Japan.
to choose the amount of public debt in their capital structure. Table 4 provides evidence on abnormal returns for firms which already have convertible debt and firms for which the convertible debt issue appears to be the first one. The stock-price reaction is significant for both groups of issues, but the stock-price reaction to a second issue is significantly smaller than the stock-price reaction to a first issue. There is therefore no evidence that firms which are not constrained by eligibility requirements entering the sample have stockprice reactions more comparable to those of American firms. Some convertible issues are secured, but most are not. Since it was easier to issue a convertible secured issue, it may be that looking at the whole sample obscures the effects of deregulation. We found 47 secured convertible issues and 385 unsecured convertible issues; for 129 issues, we could not determine whether the issue is secured or not. The average abnormal returns for secured and unsecured convertibles are 079% and 0.73%, respectively. The average abnormal return for a firm's first unsecured issue (82 issues) is 1.10% versus 0.65% for other issues. The difference is not statistically significant.
Another way to look at the role of deregulation is to investigate the relation between a firm's credit rating and the stock-price reaction to a convertible issue. Firms with a high rating are less likely to be affected by deregulation. Table 4 separates firms between those with a rating of A, AA and AAA on the one hand and those with a rating of B, 60, and BBB on the other hand.
The ratings are collected from the Nihon KeIzal Shinbun. The firms with a low rating have significantly higher stock-price reactions, but the stock-price reactions are positive for both groups of firms.
If deregulation explains our results, it should be the case that stock-price reactions become similar to the stock-price reactions of American firms in the later years in the sample. In (-3.67) convertible debt issues. For public equity issues, it appears that two years have much higher abnormal returns, namely 1985 and 1987.16 For each of these two years, the average stock-price reaction is more than three times higher than the next highest average stock-price reaction. We recomputed the average stock-price reaction for equity issues without 1985 and 1987. The 3-day announcement abnormal return without these two years is 0.24% with a t-statistic of 0.86. This evidence suggests the conclusion that the positive stock-price reaction to the announcement of equity issues for Japanese firms is unlikely to be a permanent feature of Japanese corporate finance.
"Bubble economy" effects.
We now briefly consider the effect of the "bubble economy" on the stock-price reaction.
The dramatic increase in the Nikkei 225 index stopped at the end of 1989. Ii we split the sample between issues before 1990 and issues in 1990 and 1991, the stock-price reaction to the 33 issues in 1990 and 1991 is -0.38% with a t-statistic of -0.61, whereas the stock-price reaction to the 152 issues beFore 1990 is 0.64% with a t-statistic of 2.21, The difference between these two samples is an economically significant 1.02% with a t-statistic of 1.47. This provides further evidence that the significant positive abnormal returns for equity issues announcement are limited to a subset of our sample. It provides only limited evidence about the effect of the "bubble economy" because all but five of the issues in our sample for 1990 and 1991 are in January and February 1990.
No year seems to be particularly influential for the stock-price reaction to convertible bond issues. In particular, four years have an average announcement abnormal return inexcess of 1%
These two years constitute half of the sample of announcements for the 1 980s used by Kato and Schallheim (1992) who find an average abnormal return of 0.76% with a t-statistic of 2.14 for the Board date and the following day for a sample from 1984 to March 1988. with a t-statistic in excess of 2. For convertible debt issues, the post-bull market 1991 sample shows the highest average abnormal return and the highest median in our sample. The mean abnormal return for issues before 1990 is 1.06% with a t-statistic of 6.65 in contrast to 0.96% with a t-statistic of 2.13 for issues in 1990 and 1991. The difference between these two subsamples is not significant at the 0.10 level.
4.4. The role of differences in the organization of firms.
It is often argued that Japan and the U.S. differ fundamentally in that Japanese managers have long horizons and U.S. managers have short horizons. One possible explanation (or this difference, if it truly exists, is that long-term shareholders play an important role in Japanese firms.
These shareholders, however, have a complex relationship with the firm in that they hold shares, hold debt, and conduct business transactions with it. As argued in Kang et at. (1994) , it may well be that the best analogy for such investors is Admati and Pfleiderer's (1994) fixed fraction investors. If the controlling investors hold a constant fraction of alt payouts from the firm, then new issues do not convey information about the mispricing of existing securities and the arguments of Myers and MajIuf (1984) for why share prices fall followin9 issues of risky securities do not apply.
If Japanese managers pursue different goals than American managers, in the sense that they do not care as much about wealth redistribution resulting from the sale of mispriced securities and are unwilling to sacrifice positive NPV projects to avoid such wealth redistribution, then they are less likely to issue following periods of positive abnormal returns for their securities than American managers. In the U.S., firms issue stock following periods of positive abnormal returns.'7 The explanation for this phenomenon advanced by Lucas and McDonald (1990) is that the stock is least likely to be underpriced following a period when it has done extremely well. If Japanese firms behave differently, one would not expect to observe this phenomenon. Table 6 shows that Japanese firms do not issue equity or convertible bonds following significant positive excess returns. In fact, they seem to issue convertible debt following periods of significant negative excess returns. Further, there is no significant relation between announcement abnormal returns and abnormal returns preceding the announcement. These results hold equally if we use raw returns instead of abnormal returns. Hence, the adverse selection explanation for the abnormal returns associated with new issues does not appear to hold for Japanese firms.
An alternative way of investigating the role of institutionat arrangements is to compare the abnormal returns for firms where management is more likely to behave like the management of American firms. Table 7 provides evidence on this issue. First, we divide the sample between firms that belong to a horizontal Keiretsu and (hose that do not. We find some difference between the two groups for equity issues. Namely, whereas there is no difference on issue day, the Keiretsu firms are the only ones with a significant abnormal return on the announcement day. Unfortunately, the difference between the two groups of finns is not significant. This result is similar to the one found in Kang et al. (1994) for offshore warrant bond issues. In contrast, when we look at convertible bond issues, there is no difference whatsoever between the two groups on the announcement date and the non-keiretsu firms have a significant abnormal return on issue date but the Keiretsu firms do not.
As emphasized by Saxonhouse (1993) , alternative Keiretsu classifications lead to very different lists of member firms. Consequently, the fact that Keiretsu membership is not very helpful See Asquith and Mullins (1986) . Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1990) provide a detailed analysis of the excess returns before an issue. Table 6 Excess returns prior to the Issue announcement and their correlation with the announcement abnormal return The sample includes 185 public equity offerings and 561 public convertible debt offerings between January 1, 1985 and May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The daily excess return is the issuing firm's return minus the return on a control portfolio with a similar Scholes-Williams beta esttmate. The announcement day (AD) is the day the issue is announced in the Nihon Keizal Shinbun and AR denotes the abnormal return for the 3 days surrounding the announcement day. Medians and t-statistics are in parentheses.
indicates significance of the sign-rank test at the 0.01 level. (-7.13)" (-3.97) Correlation between AR and A (p-value) Table 7 Abnormal returns by Kelretsu membership, firm size and bank loans
The sample includes 185 public equity offerings and 561 public convertible debt offerings between January 1, 1985 and May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The daily excess return is the issuing firm's return minus the return on a control portfolio with a similar Scholes-Williams beta estimate. AD denotes the day when the issue is announced in the Nihon Keizal Shinbun and ID denotes the issuance day. Medians, tstatistics and the sample size are in parentheses. , , and indicate significance of the sign-rank test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively.
Public equity issues
Public convertible issues AD-ito (-0.36) [-0.83) -0.51 (0.06) (-0.86) [0.43] in predicting abnormal returns may simply mean that our Keiretsu classification is not precise enough. This problem suggests an alternative approach to identify the firms that resemble American firms the most, namely the use of firm size. Large firms are less likely to be constrained in their actions by their shareholders or by a main bank. In particular, large firms are unlikely to have to rely mostly on bank borrowing for their financing. Panel B of table 7 provides strong evidence that size matters. Large firms have a significant negative abnormal return for the threeday window surrounding the announcement day in contrast to small firms which have a significant increase for equity issues. For convertible bond issues, the announcement effect is also significantly larger for small firms, but the announcement effect is positive for both sets of firms.
On issue day, there is no significant dflference.
An obvious concern with the size results is that they are subject to alternative interpretations. For instance size might help understand the crnss-sectional variation in abnormal returns because of microstructural effects or because size is related to the degree of information asymmetry about a firm. The argument that size proxies for microstructural effects is that small firms tend to have lower stock prices, so that the fixed part of transaction costs is more important for these firms relative to the stock price. We find that there is a significant relation between price and abnormal return in regressions that do not control for size. However, when abnormal returns are regressed on size and price, price is never significant and size is always significant. Heice, the explanation for the role of size is not a mechanical microstructural explanation having to do with the stock price. We estimated similar regressions for the issue day return and found no significant coefficient, indicating that this abnormal return may not be related to micgostwcture effects either. In the U.S., it is often argued that informational asymmetries are greater for small firms than for large firms. In the context of the Myers and MajIuf (1984) model, this would suggest a greater price drop for small firm equity issues than for large firm equity issues, which obviously is the opposite result from the one observed here. It could be, though, that equity issues have a positive effect and that issues by small finns are more unexpected than issues by large firms.
This interpretation would be promising if the average abnormal return for large firms was insignificantly different from zero; instead, it is significantly negative.
Even if large firms are more similar to U.S. firms, this may be because they have better access to capital markets rather than because of control considerations. One way to get a better perspective on this issue is to focus on firms of similar size but different reliance on bank loans Because these firms have similar size, their access to capital markets should be similar and if their abnormal returns differ, it most likely would be because the ones with bank loans are monitored by banks in contrast to the firms with no bank loans. In panel C of table 7, we also compare announcement abnormal returns between firms in our sample with no bank loan financing and firms with loan financing by banks or other financial intermediaries (these two categories of loans are aggregated in the accountin9 data reported by PACAP). Since bank loans became tess important during our sample period (see Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) ), it is important to make sure that announcements by firms without bank loans are compared to contemporaneous announcements by firms with banks loans. The results reported in panel C of table 7 are striking. The firms with banks loans have significantly higher abnormal returns than the firms without banks loans for equity issues. The difference of 2.52% is not only statistically significant, but it is also economically large. It is puzzling, though, that firms with bank loans in this matched sample also have a large negative stock-price reaction on the offering day.
Nevertheless, there is no significant difference on the offering day between the two samples.
Although we do not report these results in the table, we also split the sample into two according to loans to total assets. Firms with loans to total assets above the sample median have a threeday abnormal return associated with the announcement of equity issues of 1.16% that is significantly larger than the abnormal return of -0.26% of the firms with loans to total assets below the sample median (at the 0.01 level). The loan component of a firm's capital structure is related to the announcement abnormal return for equity issues, but not to the announcement abnormal return for convertible debt issues. There is no significant difference in panel C of table 7 between convertible issuing firms that rely on bank loans and those that do not; in addition, there is also no significant difference when we compare abnormal returns for firms with loans to total assets above the sample median and below the sample median. Table 8 presents estimates of multivariate regressions which use the three-day announcement abnormal return as the dependent variable. We present six regressions. The first Iwo show that size is more important than price in explaining the cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns. The next two regressions provide some evidence that firms belonging to a horizontal Keiretsu have higher abnormal returns. The coefficient on the Keiretsu indicator variable is positive and significant at the 0.10 level for equity issues and it is positive, but insignificant, for convertible bond issues. Table 8 Muitivariate regression of 3-day announcement abnormal returns on firm characteristics The sample includes 185 public equity offerings and 561 public convertible debt offerings between January 1, 1965 and May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The daily excess return is the issuing firm's return minus the return on a control portfolio with a similar Scholes-Williams beta estimate. The announcement day is the day when the issue is announced in the Nihon Kelzal Shinbun. MV denotes the market value of the firm in million Yen. Amount is the proceeds from the issue in billion Yen. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (TA). Debt/TA is leverage minus loans to total assets. The Keiretsu dummy takes value one it the firm belongs to a horizontal Keiretsu. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Regressions 5 and 6 relate abnormal returns to several different variables that one might expect to be related to abnormal returns based on U.S. results and on the analysis conducted so far in this paper. Since past excess returns are not informative for the abnormal returns, we use the PE ratio. writh the adverse selection model, one would expect PE to have a negative effect on abnormal return far Japan because high PE firms would be more likely to issue, so their issues would be more anticipated. Similarly, one would expect highly levered firms to be more likely to issue if high leverage means that firms are farther away from their equilibrium capital structure. The PE ratio is negatively related to the abnormal return. The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level for equity issues but is insignificant for convertible issues. We allow for a different relation between loans and abnormal returns and between the remainder of the firm's liabilities and abnormal returns. It turns out that the abnormal return for equity issues is positively related to loans normalized by total assets and is unrelated to the magnitude of other liabilities normalized by assets, With convertible debt issues, loans has a negative impact. However, this negative impact is suspect. Since PEs can take extremely high values, it makes sense to investigate whelher the regression results are affected by outliers. If we remove 5% of firms with highest and lowest PEs in each sample, the regression for equity abnormal returns is essentially unchanged, but loans/TA is no longer significant in the convertible regression.
In regressions not reported here for the convertible debt sample, we also included a dummy variable for secured debt, the Gensaki rate, and a variable equal to the difference between the coupon rate and the Gensaki rate as proxy for the magnitude of the equity component of the convertible issue. The coefficients on secured debt and the Gensaki rate are never significant. In contrast, the coefficient on the difference between the coupon rate and the Gensaki rate has a positive coefficient and is always significant. This suggests that the stock price reaction increases as the equity component falls. Since coupon rates were fairly standardized, this result should be interpreted with caution.
The coefficient on PE raises the question of whether Japan is as different from the U.S.
as argued so far. It could indicate that Japanese firms are as likely as U.S. firms to issue equity when their valuation is high, so that in both countries high valuation firms have abnormal returns dose to zero. With this view, the past excess returns might simply be poor valuation measures for Japanese firms. It turns out tharthis impression is misleading and that RE does not play the role one would expect it to play if high RE firms are more likely to be overvalued and Japanese firms behave like U.S. firms. In table 9, we divide the sample into large and small firms and large and small PE firms. Wthin firm size classes, PE does not lead to significant differences. Within PE classes, size matters. Yet, for equity issues in panel A. the large firms with high PEs have significantly negative abnormal returns of -0.91% with a t-statistic of -2.13, indicating that these firms have announcement returns more similar to those of U.S. firms. At the same time, though, there is no evidence that issues by firms with high PEs are more anticipated within a firm size class: for both firm size classes, high RE firms have higher absolute value of abnormal returns.
The results for convertible issues in panel B of table 9 indicate that small firms with high PEs have higher abnormal returns. In contrast, large firms with high PEs have lower abnormal retums.
Interestingly, the large firms with high PEs do not have significant positive abnormal retums.
Though PE does not lead to significant differences within size classes, it is puzzling that for small firms abnormal returns seem to positively related to RE whereas for large firms the opposite seems to be true. It turns out that this may be further evidence that large Japanese firms are more similar to U.S. firms. We estimated a regression or abnormal returns on a constant, RE, and PE times a dummy variable which takes value one if a firm has a market value of equity above the sample median. For equity issues, PE is insignificant and the regression coefficient on PE is -0.004 with a t-statistic of -0.312. In contrast, RE times the dummy variable has a Table 9 3-day announcement abnormal returns according to PE and firm size classes The sample includes 185 public equity offerings and 561 public convertible debt offerings between January 1, 1985 and May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The daily excess return is the issuing firm's return minus the return on a control portfolio with a similar Scholes-Williams beta estimate. The announcement day is the day when the issue is announced in the Nlhon Kelzal Shinbun. Large firms are firms with market value in excess of the median for firms issuing the same security. High PE firms are firms with a PE greater than the median for firms issuing the same security., and denote significance of the sign-rank test at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Section 5. Conclusion.
Our main findings are as follows:
1. The average total abnormal return for equity-linked debt issues by Japanese companies is unambiguously positive, whereas the average total abnormal return for public equity issues is negative but insignificant. Hence, Japanese companies have stock-price reactions to security issues that are different from those of the American companies.
2. For Japanese companies, the announcement day return is smaller in absolute value than the issue day return for public equity issues, but not for convertible issues. The large issue day return for public equity issues is puzzling in that it cannot be explained directly by microstructure considerations or price support.
3. Deregulation seems to explain part of the significant positive abnormal return associated with convertible issues, but not all of it.
4. Large Japanese companies have lower abnormal returns and hence have abnormal returns which are closer to those experienced by American companies. In particular, the largest Japanese companies in the sample have a significant negative stock-price reaction to public equity issue announcements. There is also weak evidence that companies which do not belong to a horizontal keiretsu have lower abnormal returns and strong evidence that firms with less loans in their capital structure have lower abnormal returns than firms with more loans. linked debt following a period ol positive abnormal returns.
The evidence in this paper is supportive of the view that during our sample period Japanese managers issued securities with different objectives than American managers. In particular, they were not as concerned about mispricing of existing securities as American managers seem to be and consequently the stock market's reaction to issues of risky securities was not as negative as Et typically is in the U.S. This is consistent with the view that Japanese managers care less about short-term shareholders than American managers.
